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STATUTE CHALLENGED 
Title 34, Chapter 10, Section 6(a), Utah Code Annotated 
1953 
34-10-6. Separation from pay roll- Resvgnati,on or sus-
pension of employment - Penalty. (a) Whenever an 
employer separates an employee from his pay roll the 
unpaid wages or compensation of such employee shall 
become due immediately, and the employer shall pay 
such wages to the employee within 24 hours of the time 
of separation at the specified place of payment. 
In the case of any failure to pay wages due an em-
ployee within 24 hours of a demand therefor, the wages 
of such employee shall continue from the date of sep-
aration until paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, 
at the same rate which said employee received at the 
time of the separation. The employee may recover the 
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil action. Said 
action must be commenced within 60 days from the 
date of separation; provided, however, that any em-
ploye-e who has not made a demand for payment shall 
not be entitled to any such penalty under this paragraph. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELBA tTUSTICE, LA WRE~CE JUS-
TICE, and ARTHUR A \rERETT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
STANDARD GILSONITE ICOMP ANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF F kC'TS 
Case No. 
9326 
This is an action filed by plaintiff under the pro-
visions of Title 3-±, Chapter 10, Section 6, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953), to recover alleged 'vages and the 
sum of $2,715.00 as penalty for an alleged failure to 
pay said alleged wages upon demand made by plaintiffs 
based upon said statute. (Record pp. 1-3) 
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Defendant is a Utah corporation with its principal 
place of business and the office of its president and 
general manager, Mr. Robert Pinder, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (Record p. 1) 
On approximately August 31, 1959, Pinder in-
structed one Ralph McMullin, defendant's foreman, re-
siding in Roosevelt, l~tah, to obtain the services of an 
independent mining contractor to open up a dormant 
mine shaft on defendant's Ouray claim near Ouray, 
Utah. Consequently on September 1, 1959, McMullin 
negotiated with plaintiff Elba Justice, with whom an 
oral contract was formed for the mining of ore at a 
specified rate per ton. Other terms of the contract were 
agreed upon. (Record p. 8). 
Subseqeunt to an inspection of the mine site, Justice 
informed McMullin that certain preliminary operations 
such as "mucking out" and ''timbering" would be re-
quired before actual mining operations could be com-
menced. On September 7, Justice began working. (Record 
p. 1). On September 8 he was joined by his son, plaintiff 
Lawrence Justice, and on September 15 by plaintiff 
Arthur Averett, both of whom were continually under 
the control and supervision of Elba Justice. (Record 
p. 2). 
On September 30, plaintiffs made a demand upon 
defendant for payment of $1,000.00 as wages, asserting 
that they were employees, which demand was denied on 
the belief that no employer-employee relationship 
existed bet,veen plaintiffs and defendant, the services 
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rPndered by plaintiffs being performed as preliminary 
to eonunencing mining operations pursuant to the oral 
contract bet,v·een plaintiff Elba Justice and defendant 
eorporation. 
J>laintiffs performed their last \vork at the 1nine on 
()eto her 1. (Record p. 23). On Octo her 5, Pinder met 
with Elba Justice and Ralph O'Neill, defendant's rnine 
~uperintendent, at Justice's home in l\fyton, Utah, for 
the purpose of discussing the dispute as to the status 
of plaintiffs and any amount due to them from defend-
ant. Subsequently on October 9, Pinder signed and mailed 
to Elba Justice defendant's check in the amount of 
$5:20.00 \vith the legend "Payment in full, Ouray claim 
eontract." (Record p. 9 and Exhibit 2). This check \vas 
retained by Justice and not returned to defendant until 
October 29. 
On October 15, defendant received from plaintiffs' 
attorney a letter notifying defendant of plaintiffs' claim 
for wages and threatening legal action not only for 
the wages clairned but also for the statutory penalty 
should defendant fail immediately to respond \vith pay-
Inent of plaintiffs' claim for alleged wages. However, 
suit \vas not filed on plaintiffs' asserted claim until 
Xovember 30, 1959, (Record p. 23) the last day allowed 
for filing under the limitations provision of the statute 
in question. 
Trial was had on the merits and judgment was 
entered against defendant for the wages claimed, plus 
interest, together with a penalty of $2,715.00, (Record 
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p. 26) from which judgment defendant has appealed 
insofar as application of the penalty is concerned. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Defendant bases its appeal upon the following 
points, to-wit: 
POINT I. 
THE RULING OF 'THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW 
APPLYING 'TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH 
OODE ANNOTATED (1953) TO THE CASE AT BAR WAS 
ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. SAID STA·TUTE RELA'TES ONLY TO DIS-
PU'TES BETWEEN ACKNOWLEDGED EMPLOYERS AND 
EMPLOYEES REGARDING AMOUNTS DUE AS WAGES, 
AND DOES NOT APPLY TO BONA FIDE DISPUTES AS 
·TO THE EXISTEN,CE O·F AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE 
RELA1TIONSHIP. 
POINT II. 
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW UP-
HOLDING THE CONSTITU·TIONALI'TY OF TITLE 34, SEC-
TION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
WAS ERRO·R AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. SAID STA'TUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON 
ITS FACE, CONSTITUTING A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO 
EMPLOYERS BY VIRTUALLY DENYING TO 1THEM THEIR 
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DAY IN COURT UNDER THREAT OF EXCESSIVE PEN-
ALTY. 
B. SAID STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR, CONSTITUTING A 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF THE LAW TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, 
AN ALLEGED EMPLOYER, WHERE THERE EXISTS A 
BONA FIDE DISPUTE AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN 
E:\IPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, BY VIRTUALLY 
DENYING TO IT ITS DAY IN COURT UNDER THREAT 
OF EXCESSIVE PENALTY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW 
APPLYING 'TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953) TO THE CASE AT BAR WAS 
ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. SAID STATUTE RELATES ONLY TO DIS-
PUITES BETWEEN ACKNOWLEDGED EMPLOYERS AND 
EMPLOYEES REGARDING AMOUNTS DUE AS WAGES, 
AND DOES NOT APPLY TO BONA FIDE DISPUTES AS 
TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE 
RELA'TIONSHIP. 
The first question which presents itself upon making 
an inquiry into the propriety of the ruling of the court 
belo\\"', is whether the statute used by the lo\ver court 
to penalize the defendant was applicable at all. A care-
ful examination of the wording of Title 34, ·Chapter 10, 
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Section 6(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953) reveals that 
only when an "employer" separates an "employee" 
from his "payroll" can the statute be applied to inflict 
a penalty upon one from whom wages are claimed to 
be due. Sound reasoning leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that only 'vhen there exists such an employer-
employee relationship clearly understood by both 
parties to be such, and- where the employee is in fact 
separated from his employer's payroll, should a court 
use this severe statute to punish a wilfully wrongdoing 
employer. This conclusion is supported by Chicago Rock 
Island & Pacific Railway Company vs. D. L. Russell, 
173 Ark. 398, 292 S. W. 375 (1927), which sets forth 
the general rule that penalty statutes must be strictly 
construed (being penal in nature) and must not be 
applied against one not coming strictly within their 
provisions. Accord: BiJelstein vs. Hawkins, ________ La. ________ , 
50 So. 2d 523 (1951); Chester et al vs. Davis, ________ La. 
________ , 66 So. 2d 377 ( 1953). Applying this doctrine 
to the instant case it must be concluded that unless the 
plaintiffs here were clearly employees, on the payroll 
of the defendant company and severed therefrom by 
defendant in the capacity of an employer, the penalty 
statute cannot properly be applied. 
That defendant did not in fact regard plaintiffs 
as employees is clearly evidenced by the consistent 
course of conduct which it followed. Defendant promptly 
rejected plaintiffs' first claim for wages on the grounds 
that plaintiffs were not deemed employees but inde-
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pPn<lPnt contractors preparing to commence performance 
under a 1nining contract between Elba Justice and de-
f€'ndant, and clearly infonned plaintiffs thereof. Plain-
tiffs were never on defendant's payroll and therefore 
eould not possibly have been separated therefrom as 
the statute requires. Hence, defendant, being unable to 
separate those never connected with it in the capacity 
required by the statute, cannot constitutionally be penal-
ized for such "separation." 
It is not the intent of the statute to require a de-
fendant to pay any and all demands f.or wages made 
by any persons having some relationship with defendant, 
regardless of however poorly defined such relationship 
n1ay subsequently be determined to have been. It there-
fore 1nay fairly be asked, does the intent of the Utah 
statute extend to the instant case~ Looking to the lan-
guage of the statute itself no intent to include or ex-
clude application of the penalty provision when the 
existence of an employment contract is disputed is ex-
plicit within its phraseology. However, the 'vhole tenor 
of the statute presumes such relationship already to 
have been firmly established, as it speaks of the duties 
and rights of an "employer" and ''employee." The pro-
visions of Title 34-10-6 speak not of disputes as to 
1chether wages are due, but only of disputes as to the 
amount due when it is conceded by the "employer" that 
some amount is due as "wages." 
The presence in this case of a bona fide dispute 
as to plaintiffs' status, shown in defendant's refusal to 
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acknowledge plaintiffs' claim for wages, and its con-
sistent denial of the existence of the required employer-
employee relationship, raising a bona fide dispute as to 
the very relationship which forms the crux of the 
statute, impels the conclusion that the statute was not 
intended to apply in a case such as this and that the 
lower court erred in applying the statute in this case. 
POINT II. 
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW UP-
HOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALI'TY OF TITLE 34, SEC-
TIO,N 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH ·CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
WAS ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. SAID STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON 
ITS FACE, CONSTITUTING A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO 
EMPLOYERS BY VIRTUALLY DENYING TO 'THEM THEIR 
DAY IN CO·URT UNDER THREAT OF EXCESSIVE PEN-
AL·TY. 
A thorough search of cases involving Title 34-10-
6(a) U.C.A. (1953) and similar statutes reveals no 
previous decision by any court of the precise question 
raised by this action, i.e., the constitutionality of applying 
the penalty wage provision when the existence of an 
employment contract is contested. Analogous and re-
lated decisions, however, offer strong persuasion for 
declaring such an application unconstitutional. 
In 1923 the Supreme Court of Indiana declared 
unconstitutional a statute providing that upon failure 
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b~· an Ptnployer to pay within 7:2 hours of separation 
ol' an Plllployee and upon dernand for payrnent all \vages 
due said en1plo~·ep, a penalty equal to the daily ",.age 
\rotlld accrue until the arnount O\ved \Vas paid. f3tate v. 
illarti u. 193 Ind. 1:20, 139 N.E. :2S:2 ( 1923). RPeognizing 
the po\rers of the state to irnpose p~enalties for the 
protection of certain community interests, the court con-
eluded that the state, by the enactment of said legisla-
tion, had · 'thereh~· transcended its po\rers, and hy that 
rneans denied to its citizens thus affected the benefit 
of the fundamental right of 'due process' and 'equal 
protection of the laws' guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Citing an earlier Indiana case which de-
clared unconstitutional a penalty of 10% of the "·ages 
o"·ing until paid, the court quoted: 
"Under the provision of this statute if wages 
should be demanded by an employee which the 
en1ployer denies owing or claims to have been 
paid, the lapse of 10 days consumed in negotiation 
or litigation will double the debt, and each suc-
ceeding 10 days \vill add to it as muc.h as "·as 
owing in the first place. The fact, if it be a fact, 
that the employee has demanded more than is 
due him will not prevent the actual debt from 
doubling, neither will the good faith belief on the 
part of the employer that he has paid all that 
was due ... 
''The penalty is not proportioned to the 
amount of wages \vithheld, but is \vithout limit 
as to the time during \vhich it shall continue to 
accumulate, or as to the total amount. This is not 
'equal protection of the law' nor does it afford 
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the employer 'due process of law,' but arbitrarily 
deprives him of property by threatening such 
dire consequences if he shall litigate a claim for 
wages and not be entirely successful, that he may 
fear to refuse a demand, even though convinced 
that it is unfounded and unjust. . ." Superior 
Laundry Co. v. Rase ________ Ind. ________ 137 N.E. 761 
(1923). 
The existence of an employer-employee relationship 
was not in issue in these cases, and the time 'vas not 
limited as is attempted under the Utah statute. But the 
controlling concern of the court "Tas the arbitrary 
deprivation of the employer's property without due 
process of law by threatening such dire consequences 
should his litigation of a claim for wages fail, either 
in whole or in part, that a mere demand for wages, 
although unfounded and unjust, would coerce the em-
ployer into paying the demanded sum, being thereby 
compelled to bring an action for its recovery and to 
bear the burden of proof therein. 
A similar concern 'vas expresed by the Supreme 
C-ourt of the United States in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123, 146, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S:Ct. 441 (1908) where it 
declared unconstitutional on its face a state statute 
providing for the establishment of rates for railroad 
transportation and which fixed penalties for the dis-
obedience of its provisions so severe as to intimidate 
the corporations and their officers from resorting to 
the courts to test the validity of the rates. The grounds 
upon which the court declared its decision to rest was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ll 
that it deprived the corporation of the equal protection 
of the la\\'~. Uiting exatnples "'here resort to judicial 
proee~~ is directly denied, the court states: 
~~A la \V which indirectly aceomplishes a like 
result b~~ imposing such conditions upon the right 
to appeal for judicial relief as work an abandon-
ment of the right rather than face the conditions 
upon \vhich it is offered or may be obtained is 
also unconstitutional." 
.l\gain, in Catting c. Goddard, 183 l'".S. 79, -±6 L.Ed. 
9~, ~:2 ~up. Ct. 30 (1901) the Supreme Court denounced 
the validity of a penalty provision for violation of a 
state statute by offering the following hypothetical: 
'~Suppose a la\v which, while opening the 
doors of the courts to all litigants, provided 
that a failure of any plaintiff or defendant to 
make good his entire claim or entire defense 
should subject him to a forfeiture of all his 
property or to some other great penalty; then, 
even if, as all litigants were treated alike, it 
could be said that there was equal protection of 
the laws, would not such burden upon all be ad-
judged a denial of due process of law~ 
''Of course, these are extreme illustrations, 
and they serve only to illustrate the proposition 
that a statute (although in terms opening the 
doors of the courts to a particular litigant) which 
places a burden so great as to practically intimi-
date him from asserting that which he believes 
to be his rights is, \vhen no such penalty is in-
flicted upon others, tantamount to a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws. 
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". . . It is doubtless true that the state may 
impose penalties such as will tend to compel 
obedience to its mandates by all, individuals or 
corporations; and if extreme and cumulative pen-
alties are imposed only after there has been a 
final determinat~on of the validity of the statute, 
the question would be very different from that 
here presented. But \vhen the legislature, in an 
effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a 
particular statute, so burdens any challenge 
thereof in the court that the party affected is 
necessarily constrained to submit rather than 
take the chances of the penalties imposed, then 
it becomes a serious question whether the party 
is not deprived of the equal protection of the 
laws." p. 102 (Emphasis added). 
Accord: Sparkman v. County Budget Commission, 103 
Fla. 242; 137 So. 809 (1931). 
Following the procedure of the Supreme ·Court in 
Catting v. Goddard, let us pose the extreme possibility 
under the statute in question for the purpose of point-
ing up the principle of its application. Suppose that a 
laborer on the last day of a given pay period begins 
performing work for a certain corporation as an in-
dependent contractor. At the close of the day he asserts 
status as an employee, which assertion is denied in good 
faith by the corporation. The laborer thereupon ceases 
working and waits for 58 days before making denmnd 
for payment of the one day's wage and, up·on refusal 
and failure by the corporation to pay within 24 hours 
thereafter, files an action under Title 34-10-6( a) de-
manding one day's wage plus the equivalent of 59 days' 
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wages at the daily rate as penalty. l(no,ving that the 
provisions of Title 3-1-10-6 and 7 apply only \vhen there 
exists an employer-employee relationship bet\veen the 
parties, the corporation feels no obligation to pay either 
'vages or any sum under the breached contract. Assu1ne 
the agreement for independent contracting had not yet 
been reduced to \Yriting and that therefore at trial the 
corporation is unable to offer conclusive evidence of 
the existence of such a contract. Taking notice of the 
fact that some labor had been performed \vhich pre-
sumably benefited the corporation, the court concludes 
that there is only evidence to support an employer-
employee contract. Without the opportunity of first 
having its day in court, the corporation is thereby 
retroactively subjected to a penalty bearing a ratio to 
the actual wage claimed of 5,900%. 
The invalidity of this type of cumulative penalty 
statute is explained in 23 Am. J ur. at page 631 as fol-
lows: 
"A statute which provides a continuing pen-
alty of so many dollars a day for a violation but 
which leaves it within the discretion of the per-
son in whose favor the penalty is assessed to 
bring suit at any time \vithin the statute of limi-
tations, giving him the opportunity to make the 
penalty cumulative in a manner \vholly dis-
proportionate to any loss suffered and also 
oppressive, is unreasonable and violates the con-
stitution." 
Such a statute was struck down by the court in 
Beckler Produce Company v. Anzerican Rail1cay Ex-
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press Conlpany, 156 Ark. 296, 246 S.W. 1, (1922), an 
action brought against the defendant company for dam-
ages for loss of fruit \vhich the defendant failed to de-
liver, plus a $2.00 per day penalty as provided in the 
Arkansas statute for failure on the part of defendant to 
settle the clai1n of the plaintiff \vithin 20 days. In de-
claring the unconstitutionality of the statute the court 
said: 
"The statute provides a continuing penalty 
of $2.00 per day and leaves it to the discretion 
of the owner of the goods to bring suit at any 
time within the period of the statute of limita-
tions." 
Accord: A1nerican Railway Express Co. v. Bratton, 158 
Ark. 639; 247 S.W. 379, (1923). 
Any statute with such a potential result must be 
declared unconstitutional, including the statute here in 
question which allows the alleged employee to choose 
his o\vn time for making demands and filing suit, thus 
allowing the penalty to accumulate for the entire period 
of the 60 day statute of limitations which is 1nade an 
integral part of the statute. 
In the analogous area of compliance "ith orders of 
administrative tribunals, the courts have universally 
held that when the application of the order is contested 
in the eourts, penalties may not attach until a reason-
able time after the validity of the order is established 
by judicial decree. In Natural Gas Pzpeline Co. v. Slat-
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tery. :~0:2 U.~. 300; ~:2 L.Ed. 276, r>~ ~. ( 1t. 199 ( 1937), 
tlu~ f'Pderal ~upremP ( 1ourt refused application of a 
statutory penalty provision prior to issuanee of a de-
erPP determining the validity of the admini~trative order, 
and for a reasonable time thereafter, stating: 
~~A~ the Act in1poses penalties of fro1n $500 
to $2,000 a day for failure to comply \Yith the 
order, any application of the s~atute subjecting 
appellant to the risk of the cumulative penalties 
pending an attempt to test thP validit~~ of the 
order in the courts and for a reasonable time aftPr 
decision would be a denial of due process.'' 
The indeterminate amount of the penalty there \Yas 
dependant upon the definition of what constituted a 
violation. A similar effect, however, is possible under 
the statute now before the court, as exemplified by the 
case at bar. Since the specific time for 1naking demand 
of payment within the 60 day period allowed by the 
statute is left to the discretion of the individual claimant, 
the amount of the penalty imposed is deter1nined by the 
ti1ne at which the alleged employee elects to Inake such 
de1nand and thereafter to file suit. Diligence in making 
demand for payment and filing the action thus \Yorks 
to dimish the penalty damages which become collectible, 
thereby encouraging delay to the detriment of the al-
leged employer. 
Further increase of the amount of the penalty can 
be effected under the statute (evidenced by the instant 
case) by joining in the action for recovery of wages 
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and penalties the claims of persons whom the corpora-
tion believes to be sub-contractors or employees of the 
private contractor. The unlimited number of such poten-
tial claimants plus their opportunity to enlarge their 
claims by virtue of their own delay, render meaningless 
the \\Tording of the statute attempting to make the penalty 
proportionate to the claim. 
Even \vhen the existence of an employment contract 
bet\veen the parties is not at issue there is strong reason 
for disallo,ving the application of such penalty pro-
visions prior to determination by proper adjudication 
of the amount due. The state of Kansas declared un-
constitutional a similar penalty statute, offering the 
fallowing explanation: 
"It would not do to say that every time an 
employee's service with a company was termi-
nated and there was a dispute about the amount 
due, the company should be made to pay a pen-
alty for not paying the amount demanded, es-
pecially \vhen it after\vard turned out that the 
company \vas right. To so hold would permit 
unscrupulous employees to make demands they 
knew \vould not be met, and later bring an action 
for penalties. The statute \vas not intended to 
bring about such a result." Gau,throp v . ... ~!issouri 
Pac. Ry. Co., 147 l{an. 756, 78 P.2d 85-1, (1938). 
Even if the existence of an e1nployment relationship 
were to be presumed, there still remaining a bona fide 
dispute as to the amount of wages due, pay1nent of the 
portion \vhirh is not disputed, as required by Section 
7 of the same chapter, would in no \Yay diminish the 
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atnount of the penalty. As presently worded the penalty 
\vagP <'onnnences 2-t hours after separation and does 
not wait for final adjudication of the dispute. Failure, 
therefore, to make good the entire clai1n will impose 
rPtroa<'tively the entire penalty, since the a Jno1ult of 
the penalty is related not to the a Jnou nt of 1cages in 
dispute, but to flu~ a1no u nt of the daily 1rage ear ued by 
the entplo.lJee. Hence, if an e1nployer acknowledges and 
pays $99.00 and a court thereafter declares $100.00 to 
have been owed, upon delay by the employee in making 
demand and filing an action, a penalty equal to 60 days' 
wages may attach in addition to the One Dollar actually 
owed as wages. 
The type of statute here in question, being penal in 
.nature, requires strict interpretation and should be ap-
plied only when the parties involved come strictly within 
its provisions (Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. 
t·s. D. L. Russell, supra). It therefore follows that courts 
should be reluctant to apply such statutes having grave 
consequence and impact upon the constitutional rights 
of the defendant without first liberally interpreting the 
statute at hand to insure the defendant's constitutional 
rights will not be infringed. The advisability of so 
construing their similar statute liberally has been an-
nounced and followed by the Idaho courts. Goodell v. 
Pope-Shenon Mining Co., 36 Ida. 427, 212 P. 3-l-2 (1922). 
That equitable defenses should be allowed has also been 
given 'vide approval. Bielstein v. Hawkins and Chester 
v. Da £,·i.s, supra. 
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The object of the statute 1n question is to secure 
pro1npt payment to employees of wages "\vhich might 
otherwise be withheld without good cause, not the fore-
closing by threat of penalty and criminal punishment 
the right of parties to a fair hearing and competent 
judicial deter1nination of their status. "Due process of 
la"\\'",'' stated the l~tah court in Riggins v. District Cottrt 
of Salt Lake County, 80 U. 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935), 
''requires that notice be given to the persons "\vhose 
rights are to be affected. It hears before it condemns, 
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after 
trial." Thus in Republic I ron & Steel Co. vs. Sbate, 160 
Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005 (1903), the court disallowed ap-
pication of a penalty statute which provided that after 
judicial determination that wages were due, a plaintiff 
might have judgtnent not only for the amount of the 
"\vages but also for a 50% penalty together "'"ith interest, 
stating that such statute "\vorked an unconstituional 
deprivation of the defendant's right to due process of 
la"\v and indicating it would be improper for a court 
to inflict retroactively such a severe penalty merely 
because the defendant did not prevail on the ~ssue of 
the plaintiff's claim for wages. In Jensen v. [7• P. Ry. 
Co., 6 U. 253, 21 P. 994, the court further declared, 
4 4 Due process of la\Y comes to us from the Great Charter 
and is synono1nous "\Yith 4la"\v of the land.' It means 
that a party shall have his day in court." A citizen can-
not properly be said to have been offered his day in 
court when, upon eventual failure to convince the court 
of the merits of his claim or defense, he must pay an 
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exorbitant penalty for that privilege being compelled 
to suffer the pffects of a penaty statute retroactivPly 
applied. He must fi'rst have the issue resolved as to 
his liability to pay the claim made against him and 
thPreafter, and only thereafter, be burdened \vith nny 
penalty for failure to pay the claim. 
Defendant respectfully submits that application of 
the penalty provision of Title 3±-10-6(a) U.C.A. (1953) 
was intended to prevent undue delay in payment of 
\vages to employees when no good cause therefor exists, 
but that its application when the existence of an em-
ployer-employee relationship is drawn seriously in to 
question is beyond the intent and the fair meaning of 
the statute. Such application is a denial of due process 
of la\v as secured by the Utah Constitution and is con-
trary to the spirit and letter of provisions of the federal 
Constitution guaranteeing due process of law and equal 
protection of the laws. The apparent relation of the 
penalty to alleged wages owed is rendered meaningless 
in the application thereof, thus constituting an unreason-
able penalty. Common principles of fairness favor keep-
ing unrestricted and uninhibited the right to a fair 
judicial hearing without fear of incurring or increasing 
undue penalties in the attempt. The statute as presently 
constructed lends itself to abuse by intentional delay 
on the part of a claimant thereunder, who under the 
present construction of the statute has the option to 
render the statute cumulative in effect, the possibility 
of \Vhich abuse should not be granted enlarged scope 
through -interpretation. A liberal construction of the 
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statute to effect its object and the promotion of justice 
Is both required and desirable. 
B. SAID STATUTE IS UNCONSTTTUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR, CONSTITUTING A 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
'TECTION OF THE LAW TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, 
AN ALLEGED EMPLOYER, WHERE THERE EXISTS A 
BONA FIDE DISPUTE AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN 
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, BY VIRTUALLY 
DENYING TO IT ITS DAY IN COURT UNDER THREAT 
OF EXCESSIVE PENALTY. 
The rights of due process of law and equal pro-
tection of the laws are secured to the defendant herein 
by the Fourteenth .A.mendrrient to the federal Consti-
tution, which states: 
" ... nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, ''ithout due process 
of law; nor deny to any person "\\i.thin its juris-
diction the equal protection of the la"\Ys." 
That a corporation is a "person" "\Yithin the meaning 
of this amendment 'vas established by the Supreme 
Court of the linited States in Kentucky Finance Cor-
porati·on vs. Paranrount Auto Exchange Corporation, 
262 lT.S. G~~' 67 L.Ed 1112, -1:3 S.Ct. 636 (1923). 
In addition to the federal guarantees, the ·Consti-
tution of th0 State of Utah specifically secures the right 
of due process of la'Y in the following language: 
··Due Process of Lau': No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property "ithout due 
process of la"?·" Utah Const. Art. I, Sect. 7. 
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The si1nilarity of this elause to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
A1nendtnents of the fP<leral constitution has led the 
~upren1e l 1ourt of Utah to declare decisions by the 
federal Supre1ne Court to be highly persuasive in in-
t(•rpreting· the l ,.tah provision. Unter1nyer v. State Tax 
Conun£ssion, 102 U. 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942). 
\Vhat then is the effect of applying the lTtah statute 
here in question to defendant 'vith reference to its 
constitutional rights as set forth above f 
1. First, it clearly operates as an inti1nidation 
against this defendant to deter it from contesting plain-
tiffs' claim at the risk of losing on the merits and being 
burdened with an excessive penalty. Plaintiffs' original 
wTitten notice to defendant setting forth plaintiffs' claim 
for wages allegedly owed to them by the defendant 
stated: 
~'We feel that your company has laid them-
selves wide open to severe penalty for failure to 
pay these men at the time they were separated 
from the payroll. However, if you will send us 
the following amounts we will consider the pay·-
ment in full of all claims which they might have 
against your company." 
It then sets forth the amounts which palintiffs claimed 
as wages. Having a good faith belief that plaintiffs 
were not employees, defendant should have been allowed 
the right as secured by the federal and state constitu-
tions to dispute that claim without being forced to 
proceed under the threat contained in plaintiffs' letter 
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that if their claim was not paid in cash they would 
utilize the penalty provision of the statute and severely 
burden the defendant. In spite of this threat and in-
timidation inherent in the statute and expressed in plain-
tiffs' letter, defendant chose to proceed to trial on the 
1nerits of its dispute as to the employer-employee re-
lationship alleged by plaintiffs to exist, and no\Y n1ust 
be required to pay the sum of $2,715.00 for the privilege 
of so going to court unless the holding of the lower 
court regarding application of this penalty statute is 
reversed. Without such reversal the constitutional rights 
of the defendant corporation to due process of law 
and equal protection of the law shall have been perma-
nently infringed. The doctrine of the Super~or Laundry 
(}ompany, Ex Parte Young, Catting, Martin, Sparkman, 
Beckler and Republic Iron & Steel cases, supra, compel 
a reversal of the holding of the lower court unconsti-
tutionally applying this penalty statute to the defendant. 
2. The application of the Utah statute in this 
case operates as a retroactive denial of due process 
to the defendant by charging it with a penalty commenc-
ing not at the date of judgment determining the exist-
ence of the required employer-employee relationship, but 
from the date of termination of plaintiffs' labor. Such 
an application should not be allowed under the doctrine 
set forth in Republic I ron & Steel Co. ·vs. State, supra. 
A statute \vhich in that case \vould have burdened the 
defendant \vith a 50% penalty after judicial determina-
tion that the defendant owed wages, and for that reason 
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declared uneonstitutional, is transcened 1n rs unconsti-
tutionality by the statute in this case \vhich retroactively 
infli<'ts a penalty upon the defendant in an amount near-
ly three tin1es as great as the arnoun t determined by 
the lo\vPr court to have been due as \vages. The spirit 
and tradition of our federal and state constitutions do 
not allo\v such a retroactive denial of due process. 
3. The application of the statute in this case 
operates as a eurnulative, unreasonable, and burdensome 
penalty upon the defendant. Although limiting to 60 
day8 the tirne during \vhich a penalty rnay accrue and 
incorporating a 60-day statute of liinitations in an effort 
to raise itself to the elevated sanctuary of constitution-
ality, the statute must fall because of its failure to 
designate when, in relation to the time when the penalty 
begins to accrue, the plaintiff ( s) must make demand for 
wages. The plaintiffs herein who ceased their labors on 
the 1st day of October not only waited untif the 15th 
day of October to communicate their demand to defend-
ant, but bided their time until the 30th day of November 
to file their suit, thereby exploiting to the fullest the 
cumulative possibilities of the statute. Thus \vhen the 
lower court detennined the plaintiffs to have been em-
ployees and went on to apply the penalty statute, the 
resulting amount was not limited by any statutory re-
quirement that plaintiffs 1nake their demands immedi-
ately upon separation or file their action 'Yithin a 
reasonable time after separation and thus terminate 
the period during 'vhich the penalty might accumulate. 
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Instead, plaintiffs \Vere granted penalty wages for the 
full 60 day period of lin1itations incorporated in the 
statute itself. This effect \Vould not have been produced 
but for the deliberate choice on the part of the plaintiffs 
to wait before filing their action until such time as a 
judgment for penalty could gain for them the maximum 
amount allowed under the statute and not some lesser 
amount. This effect renders the statute unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectively submitted that upon the facts of 
this case the statute in question by its own terms is 
not applicable here, for the reason that the relationship 
which constitutes the very heart of the statute and 
the very reason for its existence was, in the belief of 
the defendant, missing. To extend the statute beyond 
its intended purpose is to thwart the intent of the 
legislature and unnecessarily punish this defendant. 
Even assuming applieabilty of the penalty statute 
is this case, it is unconstitutional because of its extreme 
possibilities for denying due process and equal pro-
tection of the la\v by threatening an alleged employer 
\vho disputes bona fide a clai1nant's demand for wages 
\vith the imposition, retroactively, of an exorbitant and 
cmnulative penalty, should his claim or defense fail in 
\vhole or· in part. The statute clearly constitutes an un-
constitutional "price of admission" for the day in court 
to \vhich a defendant is entitled "free of charge." 
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The judgment entered by the court at once charged 
the defendant 'vith wages in the sum of $1,000.00 plus 
interest, and also a penalty in an amount nearly three 
ti1nes as great. In computing the penalty·, the court 
reached back in time before the adjudication of the 
issue of plaintiffs' relationship to defendant to the time 
'vhen the relationship was terminated. This is a real-
life application of the retroactive nature of this cumu-
lative and burdensome penalty provision. Thus, because 
of manipulation by plaintiffs to utilize the full effect 
of the statute, defendant has been charged with the 
sum of $2,715.00 for the privilege of having its day 
in court, the constitutional right which defendant should 
have had the opportunity of exercising unencumbered 
by the threats of plaintiffs or statute. 
For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that 
the holding of the lower court wherein it applied Title 
3-t, ·Chapter 10, Section 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
to this defendant was error and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. WILLIAl\I BRADFORD, JR. 
for Jensen, Jensen & Bradford 
Attorneys for Defendant 
141-! Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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